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CORPORATE LAW FIRMS, NGOS, AND ISSUES 
OF LEGITIMACY FOR A GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
Yves Dezalay* & Bryant G. Garth**
INTRODUCTION 
 
The dream of legal globalization was well stated by then-Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher in his 1995 article in Foreign Policy.1  Explicitly 
drawing on the legacy of the elite corporate lawyers identified with the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment,2 he characterized the Clinton 
Administration’s foreign policy as follows:  “We have put in place the 
building blocks of a more prosperous, more secure, more democratic world 
that will serve our national interests well into the twenty-first century.”3  
Enumerating achievements and outlining an agenda for the future, 
Christopher called for the strengthening and elaboration of institutional 
structures that aspire to entrench the norms of free trade and democracy:  
“These institutions have set and enforced rules of conduct among an 
increasing number of nations. . . .  They have given structure, legitimacy, 
and strength to the common enterprise of Western democracies:  avoiding 
war and promoting global economic growth.”4
Christopher’s perspective connected the legal structures designed to 
entrench the rules for global trade and investment to the role of law in 
protecting democracy and human rights.  The legitimacy of the new global 
order, he believed, depended on success on both sides of global law.
 
5  But 
the dynamics of world politics have changed considerably since Christopher 
posited his views in 1995.  The War on Terror and the global recession have 
shaken the faith in an emerging global rule of law.6
 
*  Director Emeritus of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 
  The emergence of 
China as a huge economic power has raised the question whether it is a 
**  Professor and Dean of Southwestern Law School and Director Emeritus of the American 
Bar Foundation. 
 1. See generally Warren Christopher, America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity, 
98 FOREIGN POL’Y 6 (1995). 
 2. See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in 3 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA:  THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER 
(1920– ) 718, 722–30 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
LAW IN AMERICA]. 
 3. Christopher, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4. Id. at 13. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD:  AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND 
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S 
ILLEGAL WAR (2005). 
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“threat to the west or model for the rest,” as Randall Peerenboom states.7  
But the various projects of legalization continue apace in most parts of the 
world, including within China.8  There is no inevitability to this U.S. global 
aspiration, but there continues to be growth in the role of law and lawyers in 
global governance.9
The proliferation of U.S.-style corporate law firms is one well-
documented feature of legal globalization.  As Carole Silver’s research 
shows, from 1988 to 2008, the number of overseas offices supported by the 
National Law Journal’s list of the 250 largest U.S. firms nearly quadrupled, 
and the number of lawyers working in these overseas offices increased by a 
factor of twelve.
  
10  Despite the increasing prevalence of U.S. law degrees, 
two-thirds of the lawyers in the overseas offices were educated exclusively 
outside the United States.11  The large multinational law firms based in the 
United States have assimilated local connections and talent to go with U.S. 
and global expertise.12  The Magic Circle of British solicitors’ firms, as 
well as firms from Australia and elsewhere, are also aggressively pursuing 
the global-local path with considerable success.13
Additionally, a number of local firms of varying sizes can be counted 
among the globally oriented corporate firms.  They often act as a modern-
day version of the compradors, who historically served as brokers for the 
colonial ventures of dominant Western states.
 
14  Like the compradors of an 
earlier era, these local firms have learned to speak two legal and cultural 
languages—one oriented internationally and one locally.15
 
 7. This language is borrowed from RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES:  
THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? (2007). 
  The local 
 8.  See THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22663, U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
IN CHINA 5–6 (2011) (discussing China). 
 9. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS:  
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010); David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the 
New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000).  A recent book by DAVID C. 
KANG, EAST ASIA BEFORE THE WEST:  FIVE CENTURIES OF TRADE AND TRIBUTE (2010), 
makes the point that the social, cultural, and political hegemony of China in the earlier 
period has not been replicated despite China’s recent global ascendency. See id. at 169.  
 10. Carole Silver, The Variable Value of U.S. Legal Education in the Global Legal 
Services Market, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 11. See id. at 16. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Caroline Binham, Beyond the Magic Circle, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 2011, 10:27 
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf1fbf90-a278-11e0-9760-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1Uknd
KLeS.  The American Lawyer’s Global 100 lists Magic Circle firms as two of the top four 
and four of the top seven in gross revenue for the 2009 fiscal year.  Magic Circle firms made 
up four of the top eight in fiscal year 2010 gross revenue.  Five Australian firms were in the 
top 100 in both fiscal years 2009 and 2010. See The Am Law Global 100, AM. LAW., 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202514393371 (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012) (listing Magic Circle firms Clifford Chance, Linklaters, Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Allen and Overy, and Slaughter and May, and Australian firms Minter Ellison, 
Mallesons Stephen Jacques, Allens Arthur Robinson, Freehills, and Clayton Utz). 
 14. See Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring:  International and Local Law 
Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 778–80 (2008). 
 15. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
284–88 (1996). 
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relationship varies considerably for these double agents, who are situated 
between global corporate law and local structures of power.16  In the 
extreme case, as occurred in the past in a number of colonial outposts such 
as late nineteenth-century Shanghai,17 foreign and foreign-oriented ventures 
are confined to a limited geographic or economic sphere.18
These lawyers can even play the role of modernizers, armed with the 
expertise and credibility that comes from connections with foreign trade and 
investment.  In these cases, the lawyers import the transnational legal 
expertise, and deploy (and transform) it in local contexts.
  The local 
impact from international influence is then relatively limited.  In other 
cases, the lawyers serving international business interests may use 
transnational connections to build their political and economic position 
within local structures of state power. 
19  They may bring 
New York, British, and French contract law, the practices of international 
commercial arbitration, rules governing trade stemming from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and its decisions, corporate governance rules 
connected to global finance, anti-corruption practices, and much more.20
The well-documented spread of corporate law firms globally and 
nationally is paralleled by a rise in the number of legally oriented Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) also operating at all levels.
  
Ultimately, they may facilitate the importation of sets of transnational rules 
and practices, and promoters of globalization and the rule of law indeed 
aspire to this “modernizing” result. 
21  NGOs 
now occupy a wide variety of positions locally and at the transnational 
level.22
 
 16. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 
  A number are opposed to, or seek to moderate, the neo-liberal 
9, at 19–20. 
 17. See id. at 35–37. See generally Tahirih V. Lee, Risky Business:  Courts, Culture, and 
the Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1335 (1993) (describing the evolution of the “mixed 
court” based in a foreign enclave in Shanghai). 
 18. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 35–37. 
 19. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS:  LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES (2002) (examining the import and export of technologies of governance from the 
North to Latin America). 
 20. See id. at 198–219. 
 21. On the globalization of public interest law, see generally Scott L. Cummings and 
Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 
(2008); Fabio de Sa e Silva, The World of Public Interest:  Law and Globalization in the 
Everyday Lives of Advocates (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. research project, Northeastern 
University School of Law) (on file with author). 
 22. Reportedly, “the number of known international NGOs increased from about 13,000 
in 1981 to over 47,000 by 2001.” Shepard Forman & Derk Segaar, New Coalitions for 
Global Governance:  The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism, in 12 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 205, 214 (2006).  The World Bank estimates that the number of World Bank 
projects led by NGOs, as opposed to governmental organizations, increased from an average 
of 28 percent in 1987–96, to 50 percent in 1998. WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at 
139 (1999), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/2000/06/13/000094946_99101505321247/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
See generally GLOBALIZATION, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY:  PROJECTING 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS ABROAD (David C. Hammack & Steven Heydemann eds., 2009) 
(showing how philanthropic efforts from the United States project U.S. approaches and 
therefore seek to enhance “civil society” abroad); RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS:  
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policies associated with globalization—such as free trade, privatization, free 
movement of capital—in favor of indigenous rights and environmental 
protection, for example.  The World Social Forum has brought together 
many of these groups.23  Numerous NGOs are conduits for projects funded 
by the World Bank and national development agencies.24  Those employing 
law and lawyers tend to be among the more elite and better funded NGOs.25  
Prominent philanthropic foundations, such as the Asia Foundation and the 
Ford Foundation, and development agencies, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and 
many others, also continue to invest heavily in legally oriented NGOs and 
the idea of “legal empowerment.”26  Considerable investment, for example, 
is going from the Ford Foundation to legal aid and to civil and criminal 
justice reform in China.27
There is a body of prescriptive literature that sees these proliferating legal 
organizations—law firms and NGOs—as tools for the spread of liberal 
democracy and the rule of law.
 
28  The literature is consistent with a 
longstanding belief of the liberal establishment in the United States that free 
trade, open doors to foreign investment, the rule of law, and democracy all 
go hand in hand.29  This approach took shape notably in the Philippines 
after the Spanish-American War at the turn of the twentieth century.30  The 
Philippines became the model, training ground, and to some extent, the 
showplace for this kind of desired evolution.31  Warren Christopher 
descended from this tradition.32
The community of rule-of-law supporters operates as if law is a form of 
contagion that can spread from any number of bases.  As Matthew 
Stephenson wrote, focusing on China, one way to see this is that reform in 
one area represents a “Trojan horse” for the legalization of the state and the 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram et al. eds., 
2002) (tracing the rise and impact of NGOs as transnational advocacy groups). 
 23. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance:  The World Social 
Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM 
BELOW:  TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 29, 44–46 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & 
César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005). 
 24. See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 139. 
 25. See de Sousa Santos, supra note 23, at 56. 
 26. JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE 
POOR:  FROM CONCEPTS TO ASSESSMENT (2007). 
 27. See Grant Search Results, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/Grants/
Search?searchphrase=law (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy:  The Legal Empowerment 
Alternative (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Rule of Law Series, Working Paper No. 41  
2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf; David B. Wilkins, Globalization, 
Lawyers and the Rule of Law:  Private Practice and Public Values in the Global Market for 
Corporate Legal Services (June 21, 2011), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
plp/pdf/Globalization_Lawyers_Rule_of_Law.pdf (remarks at the World Justice Forum). 
 29. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 57–61; EMILY ROSENBERG, SPREADING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM:  AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EXPANSION 1890–1945 (Eric 
Foner ed., 1982). 
 30. See ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 51–57. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Christopher, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
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economy more generally.33  Many observers hope, for example, that reform 
in the area of commercial law will lead to more recognition of individual 
civil rights.34  Similarly, they hope that reform in the method of legal 
instruction, or the development of legal clinics, will teach critical thinking 
that will lead to more leadership by law graduates in expanding the role of 
law and lawyers.35  Or, as mentioned above, they look to the rise of 
corporate law firms as a means to expand legal opportunities for individuals 
and build the autonomy of the courts.36  With respect to China, for example, 
the creation of legal aid organizations, membership in the WTO, the rise of 
corporate law, and the reform of legal education to create a more U.S.-style 
of teaching37 have all been hailed at various times as bases to bring the rule 
of law to China’s economy and government.38  There is particular attention, 
as we suggested in our introduction, to the role of corporate law firms on 
one side and legally oriented NGOs on the other.39
We frame this issue of spillover in a somewhat different manner than the 
literature on corporate law firms, legal educational reform, legal NGOs, or 
legal aid.
 
40  Our sociological approach to spillover focuses on institutions 
that facilitate or accelerate spillover processes by providing mechanisms for 
circulation (and conversion) of legal capital.  Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu 
here, as in our other studies,41
 
 33. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?  Problems and 
Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of Law’ Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of 
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 78 (2000). 
 we employ the concept of a field—for the 
present study, the legal field.  We use the concept of the field to describe 
semi-autonomous spaces in which actors compete by using various forms of 
capital (economic, social, cultural, or political).  They compete both about 
and in terms of the rules of the game of the field.  Thus, the term “field” 
 34. See id. 
 35. See generally Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-
Inspired Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60 (2009). 
 36. See Wilkins, supra note 28, at 4–6. 
 37. Jeffrey Lehman, the founding dean of a U.S. law school in Beijing, claimed that “a 
rigorous application of legal pedagogy can train students who might in the future work to 
strengthen China’s rule of law and its institutions.” Andy Guess, An American Law School in 
China, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 22, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2008/05/22/china. 
 38. Erie, supra note 35, at 76–80, 86–90. See generally ESTHER LAM, CHINA AND THE 
WTO:  A LONG MARCH TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW (2009) (linking WTO membership with 
evolution toward the rule of law). 
 39. See generally Golub, supra note 28 (focusing on legal empowerment through 
NGOs); Wilkins, supra note 28 (discussing how corporate law firms could contribute to the 
spread of the rule of law). 
 40. Portions of the following discussions draw on Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, 
Conclusion:  How to Convert Social Capital into Legal Capital and Transfer Legitimacy 
Across the Major Practice Divide, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION 260 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011) [hereinafter LAWYERS 
AND THE RULE OF LAW], and Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and 
Legitimating Two Sides of Transnational Justice:  Possible Trajectories Toward a Unified 
Transnational Field, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 277 
(Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE]. 
 41. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE 
SOCIOLOGY (1992). 
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embodies a broader concept than simply the sum of the institutions that 
operate in any given field. 
We employ the concept of the legal field for our research, but the 
contours and operation of any legal field cannot be determined a priori.  To 
say there is a national or transnational legal field, for example, does not 
necessarily mean that different subfields operate by rules that lead to the 
prosperity of the field as a whole.  The relationships can only be determined 
through empirical research, in particular through qualitative research into 
the actors, the capital that they bring to the field, the institutions and 
organizations that they create and operate, and the trajectories that actors 
and institutions follow. 
For the question of spillover, it is especially important to examine 
channels for the circulation of agents between different national (and 
transnational) legal fields or within different domains (for example, 
corporate vs. human rights), as well as between the legal and political 
arenas.  In other words, processes of spillover can be multi-directional, both 
within national spaces and between different areas of legal practice.  The 
convergence and complementarity between parallel phenomena determine 
whether spillover is accelerated or limited.  The crossing of borders 
provides opportunities for reconversion and acceleration of this kind of 
spillover.  The topic opens up many possibilities for research.  Here, we 
offer only some tentative suggestions based largely on research that we 
have undertaken, while focusing mainly on other questions.42  Drawing on 
that research, we take up the issue of whether what can be termed potential 
“subfields” of a more general legal field may be linking up in the way that 
Christopher idealized and deemed central to the legitimacy of transnational 
and national governance.43
Studies of law—or the legal field, which as we noted is a broader and 
more open concept—in the United States reveal structures of rewards and 
careers that orient actors toward both corporate law and public service, 
combining to build the prosperity of the field as a whole.
 
44  Those who 
have the highest position in corporate law draw in part on stature earned 
through public service, and correspondingly, public interest law firms (and 
also the government, for example) gain credibility and stature through the 
corporate lawyers who typically serve on their boards.45  Higher-status 
public interest entities have higher-status corporate law firms providing pro 
bono volunteers and higher-status corporate lawyers serving on their 
boards.46
 
 42. See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 
  Similarly, the same elite credentials that qualify law graduates for 
the top law firms also qualify them for the top public interest 
9; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15; 
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19. 
 43. See Christopher, supra note 1, at 7. 
 44. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 49–51. 
 45. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Legal Services for the Poor:  Access, Self-
Interest, and Pro Bono, in 12 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE, ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE 145, 151–57 (Rebecca L. Sandefur ed., 2009). See generally Bryant Garth, Noblesse 
Oblige as an Alternative Career Strategy, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 93 (2004). 
 46. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 45, at 151–53. 
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organizations.47  Even within elite legal education, the debates about the 
choices of careers are framed as if these two elite careers—by contrast, for 
example, a career in small firms primarily serving individuals—define the 
set of appropriate options.48
This orientation of the legal field in the United States gives strength and 
legitimacy to law in the more general field of state power, which is central 
to the overall prosperity of law and lawyers.  The massive commitment of 
elite law graduates to the service of major corporations
 
49 does not 
disqualify law as the leading language of governance and lawyers as key 
members of the ruling elite.  The reason is that public service and public 
interest law remain central to the legal field.  As Robert Gordon and others 
have noted, the legitimization of Wall Street law firms at the turn of the 
twentieth century through investment in good government and progressive 
politics built the position of corporate lawyers as the key players of the 
foreign policy establishment.50  They built complementary places in the 
fields of economic and state power.51  The incentives of actors in different 
subfields promoted the success of the field as a whole.52  Furthermore, law 
schools became national law schools, and success in national law schools 
and in nationally oriented careers translated into power and success within 
local legal fields.53
It is not surprising that the globalization of law in the era of U.S. 
hegemony has raised the question of the ability to construct something 
similar globally to what has long existed in the United States.  Christopher’s 
prescription for U.S.-style globalization, as noted above, follows precisely 
in the tradition of his mentor, Cyrus Vance, and other pillars of the foreign 
policy establishment.
 
54  The recipes include human rights and democracy 
on one side, and liberal trade policy on the other—with the link between the 
two as the key to lasting legitimacy.55
That public interest law has come to play an important role in 
simultaneously advancing and contesting globalization should in some 
ways come as no surprise.  To the degree that globalization is built upon 
the legal architecture of American-style liberal capitalism, one would 
  As Scott Cummings and Louise 
Trubek note:  
 
 47. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the 
Legal Profession:  The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 
914–15 (1995). 
 48. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT:  A MEMOIR OF HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 3–10 (1992). 
 49. See, e.g., JOHN HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR 42 (2005). 
 50. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”:  Fantasies and 
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:  LAWYERS IN 
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 51–74 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984). 
 51. See Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession 1870–2000, in LAW IN 
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 73, 92–98; see also Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2, at 722–26.  
 52. Cf. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2, at 722–26; Gordon, supra note 51, at 92–98. 
 53. Cf. Gordon, supra note 51, at 75–81. 
 54. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 57–61. 
 55. See id. 
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expect public interest law to occupy a similar position on the global stage 
as it does in the United States . . . .56
 The mutually reinforcing legal credibility in political and economic 
fields that we see in the United States provides a potential indicator of 
success in the project of building a stronger position of lawyers—and the 
so-called rule of law—at national and transnational levels.  Despite its 
taken-for-granted history in the United States,
 
57 spillover cannot be 
presumed either at the national or transnational level.  The U.S. model is a 
historical product embedded in U.S. politics and the U.S. social structure.58  
There has long been an emphasis in the United States on circulation and 
conversion as mechanisms for continuously reproducing and reinventing 
the social legitimacy of lawyers.59  This process is much more limited in 
Europe and in colonial settings.60  The profession has been less open and 
more limited in terms of social class in Europe and in European colonies, 
and the links between lawyers serving business and politically active 
lawyers have been more attenuated.61
U.S. discourse—coming from the distinctive U.S. approach
 
62—naturally 
focuses on spillover.  The traditional European model,63 whether in Europe 
or transplanted as part of European colonial processes, poses significant 
challenges to the successful export and import of the U.S. model.  As was 
the case for the earlier export of European models,64 the U.S. model relies 
on a process of hegemonic diffusion into dependent societies.65  And, as 
with respect to earlier periods and other hegemonic nations, imperial 
strategies are promoted as universal.  They are presented as part of a 
civilizing process, as modernization, or as some other benevolent project to 
improve others according to the standards of the imperial power.66
In the following parts of this Article, we explore two complementary 
channels of diffusion of the U.S.-style rule of law.  The first is symbolic 
export from the global North to the global South.  There, the focus is on 
national justice and the domestic rule of law.  The second form of diffusion 
is the construction of transnational justice involving purportedly global 
norms.  We examine each of these closely related channels in turn, focusing 
on whether the process of diffusion and spillover potentially brings both 
sides of justice—economic and political—and whether any emerging 
  And, as 
with respect to other empires and universals, success is by no means 
assured. 
 
 56. Cummings & Trubek, supra note 21, at 3. 
 57. See generally Gordon, supra note 51. 
 58. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 49–61, 107–11. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 92–104. 
 63. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 22–31. 
 64. See id. at 2–34. 
 65. See id. at 49–61. 
 66. See generally JENNIFER PITTS, A TURN TO EMPIRE:  THE RISE OF IMPERIAL 
LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (2005). 
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transnational legal field is strong enough to play a major role in shaping 
national legal fields, another form of spillover. 
I.  CONVERTING SOCIAL CAPITAL INTO LEGAL CAPITAL:  
THE NATIONAL RULE-OF-LAW ALCHEMY 
From the perspective of many countries, the question of spillover can be 
restated as the age-old question of whether the rule of law will replace the 
power of personal relations.67  The issue is especially pervasive in writing 
about the enduring power of guanxi in China.68  A variation of that same 
dichotomy seen in recent literature on Asian law is that of administrative 
regulation versus the rule of law.69  The power of the Korean or Japanese 
bureaucracy or the Chinese Communist Party, for example, is contrasted 
with the law and the courts.70
One manifestation of the perceived problem is the close relationship 
between the bureaucracy (or the party) and business.
 
71  One criticism is that 
the mutual dependence of business and bureaucracy inhibits investment 
from outsiders and independent entrepreneurs; another is that the lack of 
transparent rules and practices deters investment generally.72  Reformers 
seek to make law and lawyers the key to the interactions between the state 
and business, and between businesses.73  Another manifestation is in the 
dichotomy of machine politics and patronage versus law.74  As suggested at 
the outset, both of these manifestations are especially salient with respect to 
Asia, which is seen as a particular challenge to the universals hailed in the 
U.S.-style rule of law.  The term “crony capitalism” is in part meant to 
capture the kind of governance of the state and the economy thought to be 
inconsistent with transparency and the rule of law.75
 
 67. See generally Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization, and Rule of Law:  An 
Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 195 (1994) 
(contrasting Confucian approaches in Asia versus the Western rule of law). 
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 69. See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Transparency in Japanese Administrative Law, in 
LAW IN JAPAN:  A TURNING POINT 304, 304–33 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 70. See id. 
 71. A typical example is a 2006 Special Edition of the McKinsey Quarterly, which 
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 72. See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction:  A Framework for the Analysis of Legal 
Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA:  THE RULE OF LAW AND 
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 74. See Jinglian, supra note 71, at 119–20. 
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KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES 1–20 (2002). 
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The problem of spillover in this context is whether the rule of law can be 
strengthened by the various activities that are now being promoted by 
reformers from the West.  There is the hope that, for example, better 
teaching in the law faculties will strengthen the position of lawyers and 
make them leading problem solvers; that the creation of legal aid programs 
will lead citizens to see the law as a tool for the enforcement of rights; or 
that the proliferation of corporate lawyers and law firms will reshape 
business conduct away from the dominance of personal relationships 
toward more legally based transactions.  Each program, according to 
reformers, has the potential to make law count more and personal relations 
count less in China. 
Our approach begins with the idea that these dichotomies—variations on 
law versus personal relations—are not in opposition to each other but rather 
are potentially complementary.  The social capital of personal relationships 
and legal capital do not represent opposing approaches.  The legal requires 
the personal, and the personal may gain from the legal.  Legal capital gains 
value to the extent that social capital is embedded in the law.  Similarly, the 
power of social and economic relations can be strengthened through the 
legitimacy that the law can provide. 
The issue of spillover at the national level therefore turns on the question 
of how and whether activities in a sector of law and the legal field lead to 
the accumulation of social capital that can be transformed into legal capital.  
Put in our sociological terms, therefore, we examine the continuing 
renegotiation of the rate of exchange and division of role in that process.  
The renegotiation process involves not only personal relations, the state, 
and the party, but also relationships between different governing knowledge 
and different ideologies.  Stated simply, the power and legitimacy of law 
and lawyers depends on the law’s relationship to state capital, family 
capital, and economic capital in particular.  To the extent that those with the 
advantages of family, resources, and access to the machinery of government 
invest in law and use law and legal language to legitimate their power, the 
legal field will gain strength.  Conversely, if lawyers do not attract the well 
connected and powerful, and if lawyers are cut off from state and economic 
power, the legal field will be weakened. 
Focusing on Asia as a particular test, the challenge can be stated simply.  
China, Japan, and South Korea are the largest economies in Asia; each 
developed historically within the Chinese Confucian sphere, and that 
history arguably fortifies a different approach to governance than the 
approach promoted in the West.76  Further, since World War II, the models 
for development of all three countries have differed from the West’s 
preferred paradigm.77  South Korea and Japan helped define the East Asian 
model of state-led and export-driven development,78
 
 76. See generally KANG, supra note 
 and China, led by the 
9. 
 77. See, e.g., FISHLOW ET AL., MIRACLE OF DESIGN?  LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN 
EXPERIENCE (1994). 
 78. ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:  ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 73–112 (2003). 
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Communist Party, has experienced a gradual opening to capitalist 
initiatives.79
We do not have the space to explore the particular mechanisms of 
governance in these three countries, but we can make a few observations 
about the place of law and lawyers, and how that place might be changing 
in relation to globalization.  We draw on the recent literature to see if there 
is evidence of a strengthened role for law and lawyers in the state or in the 
economy—or gaining strength in both, as in the idealized version of law in 
governance. 
 
The first concern, as noted above, is the extent to which social capital is 
becoming embedded in the law.  The Chinese legal profession is divided 
between a relatively small corporate bar and the large rank and file of 
mainly criminal lawyers.80  The literature suggests that the criminal bar 
remains relatively marginal and, for the most part, weak in valued capital 
such as relationships to the Communist Party and the government.81  In 
fact, Ethan Michelson explains that those in the criminal bar with the 
closest connections to the government or former government careers are 
more likely to have a relatively high opinion of the legal system.82  The 
relative status of these lawyers leads them to be taken more seriously and 
therefore to be better able to resist the interference of local party officials 
and bureaucrats.83  The corporate bar in China has accumulated more 
status, but it remains in a situation reminiscent of the colonial bar found 
historically in foreign enclaves.84  The corporate lawyers mainly serve as 
go-betweens for foreign clients investing in or trading with the Chinese.85  
It does not appear that corporate lawyers are playing any role in Chinese 
politics, much less in any effort to legalize politics.86  Thus, the evidence to 
date for spillover fueled by the accumulation of social capital into legal 
capital is very thin in China, despite any number of reform projects 
promoted by the West.87
The Japanese bar, by contrast, has a long commitment to social justice 
issues, and Japanese lawyers enjoy the prestige that accompanies the bar’s 
very small size and prosperity.
 
88
 
 79. See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 
  From that perspective, again in contrast to 
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 80. See Randall Peerenboom, Searching for Political Liberalism in All the Wrong 
Places:  The Legal Profession in China as the Leading Edge of Political Reform?, in 
LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 239, 248, 250. 
 81. See Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity 
in China’s Transition from Socialism, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 
39, 42–43; Peerenboom, supra note 80, at 250–52. 
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China, the bar appears to have built up credibility and social capital.  But 
there are strong limits that disconnect the Japanese bar from politics and the 
economy.  When the increasingly powerful military asserted itself in the 
period between World Wars I and II, the independent bar found a small but 
highly profitable niche as litigators, and its lawyers were fortified with 
legitimacy as moral champions of social justice.89  Lawyers in Japan had 
considerable prestige, but the number of lawyers admitted to the bar was 
very small.  The state had relatively little difficulty thwarting the efforts of 
lawyers to take on new terrain and play a role representing new social 
groups or interests.90  Similarly, the Japanese corporate bar did not develop 
in a way that facilitated movement into state power or economic power.91
We can surmise that the long pedigrees of the Japanese business 
interests—the keiretsu groups—linked them directly to the Japanese state 
bureaucracy and governing party.
 
92  The existing establishment in Japan 
was relatively cohesive, and that cohesiveness was maintained after World 
War II.93  Legitimacy was assured with the continuity of the Emperor on 
the one hand, and electoral democracy on the other.  As with China, there 
was no crisis of legitimacy—for example, a discredited authoritarian state, 
overactive military, etc.—which internationally oriented lawyers could use 
to build up their role in the field of state power.  Further, since the economy 
was relatively closed for much of the period after World War II,94 the 
corporate bar did not benefit from the growth and legitimacy that might be 
grounded on a strong foreign clientele.  The corporate bar is certainly 
growing.  There is evidence that graduates of the most prestigious schools 
have shifted career priorities in favor of the corporate law firms,95
In these circumstances, the social capital that Japanese lawyers possessed 
has not converted to state capital.  Stated in the language of spillover, the 
legitimacy for one part of legal practice—the more traditional litigation 
practice—has moved slowly both to corporate law and to state power, and 
vice versa.  To date, the spheres are very separate.  Lawyers have not been 
able to accumulate the requisite social capital.  In some respects, therefore, 
the bar in Japan is in a far better position than its Chinese counterpart, but 
there has not been much opportunity for lawyers to make themselves useful 
as brokers between business and state interests, and between such interests 
and international investors. 
 but this 
growth has been relatively recent. 
 
 89. Id. at 163. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Kay-Wah Chan, The Reform of the Profession of Lawyers in Japan and Its 
Impact on the Role of Law, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 185, 191–
97. 
 92. See id. at 186–87. 
 93. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE:  THE GROWTH OF 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925–1975 (1982). 
 94. Id. at 83–115. 
 95. See Chan, supra note 91, at 196–97; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s 
Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 466–
74 (2003). 
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In South Korea, by contrast, we see a faster transformation than in the 
other contexts largely because of the decline in legitimacy for the military 
and authoritarian government.96  As in Japan, there was a small but 
relatively prestigious legal profession (indeed built by the Japanese),97 and 
a well-established corporate bar focused on foreign trade and investment.98  
The authoritarian regime, which lasted until the late 1980s, saw a number of 
lawyers who championed the victims of military repression.99  They could 
then present themselves as organic intellectuals of the new social forces 
emerging with the transition to democracy.  The activists and the corporate 
bar had very strong ties to the United States, and could draw on those links 
and the ideology of empowering civil society and law to promote non-
radical democratic politics.100  The politics offered a strong role for lawyers 
who had previously been marginalized in the military regime.101  In the 
language of capital exchange, these lawyers were well positioned to obtain 
a favorable rate of exchange for their legal capital in the relationship 
between the representatives of the old regime—the chaebols,102 economists 
linked to the United States, and others—and the new groups emerging after 
democracy and liberalization.  The circumstances of a political crisis of the 
authoritarian regime—fueled both by domestic and international opposition 
(since the United States, with the end of the Cold War, no longer supported 
authoritarian anti-communist regimes)103—changed the terms quickly and 
moved lawyers, including a number of corporate lawyers, into much 
stronger positions in the field of state power.  Another feature of South 
Korea was the number of Korean-Americans who returned both before and 
after democratization, with many working in the large corporate law 
firms.104
When guns and economists were not enough for international credibility, 
lawyers could speak the international language of democracy and human 
rights, and build U.S.-like institutions to promote those views.  The 
relatively quick accumulation of social capital into legal capital in South 
Korea has, in contrast to China and Japan, strongly increased the value of 
legal capital and therefore the strength of the legal field. 
  They strengthened the ability of Korean firms to handle major 
transactions involving global trade and commerce, and they also brought a 
capital of relationships and credentials from the United States. 
Indonesia represents a similar case worthy of note.  Because of its 
importance in the Cold War,105
 
 96. See Kim Seong-Hyun, The Democratization and Internationalization of the Korean 
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embedded in the U.S. marketplace of ideas and intellectual exchange.106  
Here, too, U.S.-trained economists as technocrats provided an essential part 
of the original legitimacy of the military’s authoritarian regime, and the 
U.S. generally helped to sustain the regime as a bulwark against 
communism.107  Although lawyers were mainly outside the government, 
they built a role as corporate lawyers serving investors from abroad who 
poured money into Indonesia when Suharto opened up the economy in the 
mid-1960s.108  The attraction of raw materials and a divided economy, 
owned in part by the government and the military and in part by ethnic 
Chinese families,109 provided opportunities for elite lawyers to build a 
brokering and mediating role.  Their elite status and foreign connections 
also allowed these lawyers to combine their profitable service as corporate 
lawyers with investment in legal aid and human rights.  These initiatives 
were more or less tolerated by the Suharto government because of their 
relative moderation, as well as the social position of the lawyers and their 
ties to the United States.110
What began in the 1970s in Indonesia gained strength in the 1980s—
especially after the financial crisis toppled Suharto—and now has emerged 
a generation later as a taken-for-granted role for lawyers in and especially 
around state power.
  They were therefore able to rebuild some of the 
stature lost during the Cold War and the developmental state. 
111
There is another dimension to the question of the legitimacy of law and 
lawyers—and the likely spillover across sectors of the profession—that we 
have not yet addressed.  The market of legal education has a potential role 
to play.  Legal education is one of several important places for the 
production of the legitimacy of law.  It is a place where social capital and 
political capital can be turned into legitimate legal capital.  We develop this 
point further in the concluding part of this Article, but first continue the 
emphasis on Asian countries and the potential challenge they provide for 
spillover and more general legal legitimacy.  Interestingly, China, Japan, 
and South Korea have all recently stepped up their efforts to Americanize 
their legal education.
  As in China, philanthropy and development 
assistance have gone into legal aid and a variety of forms of public interest 
law, but the spillover successes came from the relationship of that 
investment to brokers well connected to the Indonesian state and economy.  
Lawyers with international connections and training are at the forefront of 
today’s modernization in Indonesia. 
112
Lawyer-activists in South Korea early in the twenty-first century came up 
with the idea of moving the undergraduate system of legal education toward 
  We contrast these efforts in the remainder of this 
part. 
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the graduate J.D. model found in the United States.113  The idea was picked 
up in Japan, and in 2004, Japan was the first of the two to adopt this new 
approach.114  The hope of reformers in Japan was to increase the supply of 
lawyers—in particular, corporate lawyers—who would serve Japanese and 
foreign businesses and increase the role of law as compared to that of 
personal relations and the Japanese state bureaucracy.115  They sought to 
make bar passage simpler in an effort to encourage law students to learn 
problem-solving and practical skills rather than focus only on the bar, 
which often led students to attend bar prep courses rather than their law 
school courses.116  The reformers also hoped to encourage more well-
rounded students to come to law, since the model contemplated law as a 
graduate rather than undergraduate degree.117
Despite the creation of some seventy law schools,
 
118 the system does not 
appear to have been changed dramatically to date.  Bar passage is not as 
high as reformers had hoped, and the bar in particular has strongly resisted 
the increase in the supply of lawyers and the relaxation of the bar passage 
standards.119  It is relatively early, but commentators do not deem the 
reforms a success in converting the position and potential role of lawyers in 
Japan.120
By contrast, South Korea built upon a closer connection with the growing 
position of law and lawyers in the Korean state.
 
121  Part of the difference is 
time.  We can see in retrospect that South Korean lawyers in the 1980s 
began to build their position in relation to changes in the state and what the 
state sought in international credibility.122  The passage of time allowed the 
change to become embedded and naturalized.  It is not surprising that the 
cosmopolitan political role for lawyers now seems to be taken more for 
granted.  The new law schools in South Korea fit this new context.123  They 
are geared to admit and train students who are not just the traditional law 
students selected because they can perform well on an exam that mainly 
tests memorization.  Such examinations tended to favor lower-middle-class 
students driven to succeed.124
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  The new schools select not only on the basis 
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of exams, but also on travel experience, linguistic ability, service to NGOs, 
and the like—potentially a recognition of the new elite role for lawyers.125
Let us turn to the situation of China.  As noted before, the hope of many 
rule-of-law proponents has been that various reforms or innovations might 
serve as Trojan horses on behalf of individual rights and the rule of law.  
What happens in one area will spill over into others, in particular the 
Chinese state.  Administrative or party guidance will turn into a more 
neutral rule of law.  Spillover applies directly to the issue of lawyers as 
brokers, taking advantage of opportunities—especially crisis moments—to 
make connections that strengthen their own position and provide a new 
version of state legitimacy.  In China, there has also been some investment 
in the reform of legal education, including modeling a J.M. degree program 
after the U.S. J.D. degree
  
Legal education reform in South Korea, as sought in Japan, is about 
improving the engagement of students, enhancing skills and problem-
solving, and enlarging the corporate bar; but it is also about matching those 
improved legal capabilities with students better endowed with social 
capital. 
126 and the introduction of clinical education—
again modeled after the United States.127  It is also indicative—and 
reminiscent of the early days of the Soochow Law School and its foreign-
trained faculty—that the effort, beginning in 2007, to build an American-
style law school at Beijing University, has attracted considerable attention 
inside and outside of China.128  The undergraduate faculties of law, 
however, seem still to be more prestigious, and most lawyers remain in a 
relatively marginal position.129  Those with the most prestige, namely the 
relatively small corporate bar, remain outside of the main world of Chinese 
politics and the state.130
Corporate law firms provide another potential site for the conversion of 
capital.  The example of South Korea is but one of many where corporate 
law firms bring together people moving in and out of the government, 
leading families, legal expertise, and domestic and international legal 
capital.  One part of the success to date in South Korea has been the 
credibility within South Korea—built through Cold War projects of 
educational exchange, links to human rights NGOs and corporate law firms, 
  As elsewhere in Asia, the market in legal 
education reveals much about the prospects for any kind of spillover from 
corporate law into state governance. 
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and considerable economic exchange—of approaches emanating from and 
consistent with the United States.131
The ideals of Christopher and those linked to his position seek more than 
building the rule of law in national settings throughout the globe.  They 
seek also to take the principles of free trade and investment, democracy, and 
human rights, and embed them in transnational institutions.
  By contrast, to the extent that such 
approaches are deemed to lack domestic credibility, it will be more difficult 
for corporate law firms to make such conversions of transnational exported 
capital into legitimate national capital. 
132
II.  TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE:  POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES TOWARD 
A UNIFIED TRANSNATIONAL FIELD 
  We turn 
now to this parallel strategy, which faces the same issues of spillover and 
credibility.  Given the challenges we have already seen at the national level, 
the question is whether activity at the transnational level can entrench the 
same kinds of rules and institutions into some form of transnational 
governance. 
The ultimate fate of transnational justice—and transnational rules as the 
bases for determining “modern” and legitimate local rules—depends on the 
ability of legal entrepreneurs to make the case that the globalization of law 
is not just about allowing multinational corporations to profit globally 
according to transnational rules of the game.  Transnational law must be 
more than a tool to overcome more restrictive policies promoted by 
individual states.  The challenge, as we have noted, is to build credibility 
for propositions such as that transnational law and procedures may prevent 
states from committing injustices to their own and other citizens.  It may 
also prevent corporations from using their global reach to enhance profits 
by abusing individuals and harming the environment, in addition to 
restricting the ability of states to regulate foreign investment within their 
boundaries.  The question, therefore, is whether two sides of a potential 
transnational legal field will both take hold.  One is the transnational 
political side, exemplified by international human rights and peacekeeping; 
the other is the transnational economic side, exemplified by international 
commercial arbitration, corporate law, the global trade regime, and the 
global rules for intellectual property. 
The first section of this part explores the development of a transnational 
legal field.  It draws on studies of transnational phenomena that we have 
undertaken in the past.133
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  In particular, international commercial arbitration 
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provides a prime example of transnational economic justice, and the field of 
international human rights exemplifies transnational political justice.  
Drawing on others’ work, we also briefly examine peacekeeping, 
transnational criminal law, and transitional justice on one side, and trade 
and intellectual property on the other.134
Our approach in this section requires a little more elaboration of our 
research strategy.  As we have emphasized in all of our work, sociological 
research into the operation of national or transnational fields requires 
analyses of the people who operate in and define the various fields.
  Taken together, these domains 
cover much of what exists as the potential for a transnational legal field.  
They encompass the potential linkage between corporate law firms on one 
side, and legally oriented NGOs on the other. 
135
For the purpose of this part of the Article, we use both the geneses and 
further evolutions to contrast the developments on the political and 
economic side of a potential transnational legal field.  We explore whether 
the two subfields provide possible paths toward a more unified field—a 
transnational manifestation of the spillover effect.  As we will show, the 
major differences between the political and economic sides appear after the 
period of the geneses.  The geneses of the transnational fields or subfields 
in fact reveal many parallels between the political and economic 
developments. 
  
Personal interviews reveal where key actors come from, what forms of 
capital they bring to the field, how that capital is valued in terms of career 
trajectories, and what drives the competition for dominant positions in the 
field.  By tracking a number of individuals’ activities, we can also link the 
national and transnational.  Actors use their national capital to gain stature 
internationally, and vice versa.  The synchronic approach focusing on the 
present structure of fields is then joined with a more diachronic approach—
examining, in particular, the genesis of the fields being studied and the 
institutions that inhabit those fields. 
As with respect to institutions and the fields in which they operate more 
generally, the forces evident at the beginning are typically obscured once 
institutions become more established and appear more natural.  The passage 
of time, consistent with the Weberian paradigm,136
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 brings routinization—
evidenced by the repeat players who operate the institutions.  We can see 
this development on both the political and the economic sides.  This second 
phase, however, despite the apparent success and naturalness of the legal 
developments, is characterized by much more distinction between the two 
subfields.  From this comparative perspective, the prospects for the 
economic side of transnational justice appear much brighter than those for 
the more political side.  In this sense, we suggest a lack of spillover, or 
more precisely, an asymmetry in the development of the transnational field.  
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The parallel paths appear to be diverging, and divergence poses an obstacle 
to the unified transnational field that enhances the credibility of law and 
lawyers. 
In order to see potential means for further convergence, we introduce the 
example of the transnational legal field in Europe.  The study of the 
relatively successful process of building transnational justice at the 
European level helps to generate potential hypotheses for how a similar 
process might proceed in the more general transnational legal field.  It is 
also not just a matter of comparison and hypothesis generation.  As 
discussed in Part II.B, the process in Europe involves lawyers drawing on 
their national capital, scholarly investment, transnational contacts and 
capital, and courts initially established with very limited roles—the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the economic side and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the more political side—to develop and 
legitimate law on both sides. 
Both European courts moved from their relatively limited initial agendas 
to become quasi-constitutional courts.137  Furthermore, as they moved, they 
built—and competed with each other in constructing—transnational legal 
credibility that facilitated a transnational knowledge that crossed the 
boundaries between the corporate and regulatory domains and the human 
rights or governance domains.138
Finally, drawing on hypotheses generated by the European example and 
the history of the United States, we examine other potential factors that may 
bring the two dimensions of the transnational legal field together.  In 
particular, we briefly examine what has been termed the globalization of 
legal education. 
  The post-World War II history of Europe, 
in short, provides both a key example and a component of the development 
of transnational legal fields. 
A.  Initial Phases in the Development of a Transnational Legal Field 
The initial phase in both the economic side and the political side of the 
emerging transnational field was very similar.  For both the human rights 
side and international commercial arbitration, there was a crisis situation or 
shock effect that allowed the initial accumulation of legal investment.139
The process involves an almost accidental production of “avatars” 
representing a potential legalization in a particular arena.
  
The shocks can be seen as external to the legal world—they were 
experienced as political or economic events—but they provided 
opportunities that played out in the legal world. 
140
 
 137. See generally Antonin Cohen, The European Court of Justice in the Emergent 
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  As is true with 
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respect to legal production generally, transnational law is not a product that 
simply arises in response to a demand or need.  Neither international human 
rights nor international commercial arbitration, despite what may appear in 
retrospect, developed simply because there was a problem that the law 
naturally came in to solve.  Rather, lawyer-brokers played a key role in 
building and legitimating the market for their services and expertise.  One 
key to the creation of new institutions is the inability of existing courts and 
more traditional law to adjust quickly to dramatic social and political 
changes precipitated by particular crises. 
1.  International Commercial Arbitration 
The development of international commercial arbitration is closely linked 
to crises associated with decolonization and the battles for the control of oil 
production in the period after World War II.141  Oil nationalizations were 
symptomatic of the rise of nationalism and the erosion of the paternalistic 
relationship between the Seven Sister oil companies and national leaders.142  
These tensions led to the creation of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and culminated in the oil crisis of the 
1970s.143  As the price of oil went up, the stakes of the control over oil 
profits increased dramatically.144  Oil companies whose positions were 
threatened lined up the support of their home countries, and together 
invested substantial resources into rebuilding their prior lucrative 
positions.145  Law was not at the core of the response.  Managers and 
lawyers of the oil industry used diplomacy, the threat of gun boats, and 
personal relationships to respond to the nationalizations and other attacks 
on their position.  For the most part, they were successful in maintaining 
their role in the production and distribution of petroleum resources.146  
Histories of these events typically do not even mention law or lawyers,147
The longstanding concession agreements entered into between the oil 
companies and the oil-producing states contained arbitration clauses.
 
but lawyer-entrepreneurs took advantage of the situation. 
148  
The clauses were inserted because of the perceived legitimacy of state-state 
arbitration and the role of international law experts who consulted with the 
large oil companies.149
 
 141. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 
  The companies chose to invoke the arbitration 
clauses as one additional option, but they paid very little attention to the 
processes or outcomes since the key—no matter what the outcome of the 
arbitration—remained negotiations and the power that could be mobilized 
15, at 74–86. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 77–78. 
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 145. See id. at 83–85. 
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to support them.150
The experts in arbitration were at that point a group of law professors and 
others, centered in Paris at the International Chamber of Commerce, who 
studied and promoted arbitration as a kind of hobby.
  Arbitration was very much a sideshow, and the blank 
check for the arbitrations was dwarfed by the resources used for other 
strategies. 
151  They professed the 
virtues of international commercial arbitration as a way to resolve 
transnational commercial disputes.152  Their ties to the oil industry were 
relatively weak at the time, but they were brought into the arbitrations and 
provided them with what amounted to essentially unlimited resources.153  
They already had produced a body of legal scholarship that could provide 
some of the raw material necessary to equip the field.154
Partly because it was a sideshow, the arbitration lawyers on both sides 
were able to treat the legal disputes as epic legal battles involving grand 
legal principles.  Lawyers in the nationalization cases developed highly 
formal legal arguments while the actual resolutions of the disputes 
proceeded by other means.
  Further, their 
students from the global South—including Algeria and Egypt—were ready 
to see the virtues of arbitrations that would involve their mentors and likely 
also themselves. 
155  The result was a series of closely reasoned 
arbitral opinions that have long been the staple of international law 
courses.156
Legal capital accumulated through initial investments, and then later, 
through the outpouring of scholarship promoting, rationalizing, and 
elaborating the jurisprudence of the arbitration cases—and making the cases 
central to casebooks.
  They had virtually no practical impact at the time, but here, as 
elsewhere, that lack of practical impact allowed the field to develop. 
157  Those with key positions in the cases gained 
stature and credibility, and this combination of factors jump-started this 
transnational legal field and put it in a perfect position to take advantage of 
the disputes that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as petrodollars and 
Eurodollars were invested in major infrastructure projects leading to major 
arbitrations.158
2.  International Human Rights 
  The oil crises, in short, provided the funding and credibility 
to a group of self-proclaimed amateurs and hobbyists who later became the 
backbone of the international commercial arbitration industry in the 1980s. 
As with respect to international commercial arbitration, the key actors 
and events that led to the creation of the field of international human rights 
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involved a very different group than the legal actors who developed and 
then profited from the field.159  Again, the starting point was a series of 
international crises, in this case revolving around the politics of the Cold 
War.  Guerrilla movements existed in much of Latin America;160 there was 
a democratic socialist movement in Chile,161 and there were violent military 
reactions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and elsewhere.162  The hardening of 
U.S. positions after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba helped to fortify 
these authoritarian reactions.163
The relatively small group of human rights activists played a fairly 
marginal role in the so-called cultural Cold War, exemplified by the CIA 
sponsorship of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on one side, 
and by communist ties to the International Association of Democratic 
Jurists (IADJ) on the left.
  As with respect to the early period of 
international commercial arbitration, there existed a group that could almost 
be called international human rights hobbyists. 
164  Amnesty International, founded in 1961, was 
an outgrowth of the ICJ seeking to gain more of a distance from the 
partisanship of the Cold War.165  As with respect to the amateurs of 
international commercial arbitration, there were idealistic actors in and 
around these groups who sought to build on the human rights developments 
that came in the aftermath of World War II.  But again, it is instructive that 
histories of the Cold War generally do not view human rights activists as 
influential enough to merit discussion.166
In the United States, palace wars related to the Cold War took a major 
turn in the late 1960s in relationship to the U.S. militancy exemplified in the 
support of authoritarian regimes, and especially in the Vietnam War.
 
167  
Campus uprisings and the split in the Democratic Party over Cold War 
tactics led to the election of Richard Nixon.168  The so-called “hawks” in 
power in the United States supported the coup that brought Pinochet to 
power in Chile in 1973.169  The so-called “doves,” whose growth had split 
the U.S. establishment, retained considerable power.170  They controlled the 
elite universities, the major philanthropic foundations, a good portion of the 
Congress, and much of the establishment media.171
 
 159. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 
  Nevertheless, they 
were powerless to stop the Nixon Administration’s embrace of 
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authoritarianism in Latin America and elsewhere.172  There were continued 
demonstrations on campuses, peace campaigns, and other oppositional 
activities that are the center of what historians depict when they examine 
the 1960s and early 1970s.173
The out-of-power elite invested in the legal terrain as one of their 
strategies.  They found in the discourse of human rights a tool that they 
could use at least rhetorically against the Nixon Administration.
 
174  They 
discovered and began to work with groups like Amnesty International.175  
They also found that many lawyers and activists in the South were pleased 
to embrace and contribute to this discourse, since it freed them from the 
more politicized mantle of simply defending communists or 
revolutionaries.176  In particular, leftist labor lawyers in Argentina,177 and a 
group of elite lawyers in Chile close to the administration of Salvador 
Allende, became connected to, among others, the international media, elite 
bar groups, Amnesty International, and the Ford and MacArthur 
Foundations.178  Later, when they were exiled, those elite lawyers joined 
groups such as Amnesty International and became human rights 
professionals.179
The moral, political, religious, and economic resources that now 
mobilized to question Cold War tactics and the support of repressive states 
were invested in this new transnational field.  An outpouring of academic 
research brought further credibility.  Amnesty International won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1977, and the Chilean model of human rights advocacy 
spread around the globe with the aid of the Ford Foundation.
 
180  Human 
rights activism and scholarship became very prominent in elite law schools 
in the North and the South.181  By the end of the Reagan Administration, 
the international human rights movement was powerful enough to have a 
very strong practical impact on U.S. foreign policy.182  When Pinochet 
sought to stay in power, for example, the United States under Reagan—and 
led by Reagan Administration officials who came to embrace human 
rights—forced him to submit to an election that pushed him from office.183
In both cases, the relatively weak links between the shocks and the legal 
repercussions created opportunities for autonomous investment using 
outside resources, both economic and scholarly.  These outside investments 
built the transnational legal infrastructure for both arbitration and human 
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rights.  It turned the hobbyists of arbitration into well-paid lawyers and 
arbitrators in the service of transnational private justice, and it turned labor 
lawyers in Argentina, criminal lawyers in Chile, and civil rights lawyers in 
the United States into human rights lawyers in the service of a global 
human rights regime prominent in foreign policy decision making around 
the globe. 
Part of this process can be portrayed as a boomerang effect:  initially 
weak institutions and legal fields turn into much stronger ones with altered 
and ambitious agendas.  Mikael Madsen focuses on this impact for the 
human rights field in Europe,184 where the French and British governments 
initially endorsed European human rights developments—the creation of 
the Council of Europe, the European Commission on Human Rights, and 
the ECHR—because they were sure that they were immune from any 
challenges.185  They were on the human rights side in the Cold War as 
representatives of the anti-Communist West.186  They also were careful to 
make sure that their relationships with colonies were not included in the 
treaties that created these institutions.187  But the initial Cold War 
orientation shifted, and the evolving European human rights regime took 
aim at the repressive means by which European countries policed their 
colonies, especially the French in Algeria and the British in Northern 
Ireland.188  The boomerang impact of investment made for other purposes 
was not limited to activities in the colonies.  The ECHR now regularly takes 
on the criminal justice systems of the countries under its jurisdiction.189
Another phenomenon that contributes to these developments toward 
institutionalization has long typified initiatives in the law.  Often a new 
principle is announced in a judicial opinion, for example, but not enforced 
or implemented.
  
The institutions literally bounce back on the original objectives of the 
founders—very much contrary to the founders’ aims and expectations. 
190  It represents a kind of trial balloon; professors may 
then pick it up, it may be discussed and legitimated for particular purposes, 
and finally, it can be enforced and elaborated upon in new cases as if it was 
not really a new departure.  This is the classic approach of cases such as 
Marbury v. Madison,191
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rights (and the ECJ).192
In short, political and economic crises may contribute to change by 
setting events in motion that at some point find their way to new 
institutional approaches to law.  There are many other examples of major 
political and economic events triggering—almost by accident—relatively 
weak but later significant legal initiatives, but only a few of them have been 
studied in depth from this perspective.  For example, the unsuccessful effort 
by the Argentine generals to take back the Malvinas/Falkland Islands from 
the British led to the fall of the military regime.  This provided an 
opportunity to invest in new legal institutions, almost as sideshows, leading 
to the Argentine Truth Commission and ultimately to the phenomenon of 
transitional justice, which spread around the globe.
  The academic credibility takes hold before the 
practical political and economic impacts.  It is easy to see how this process 
played out with respect to both international commercial arbitration and 
international human rights. 
193  Similarly, the 
environmental disaster associated with Union Carbide and Bhopal set in 
motion more legalized approaches to transnational environmental issues.194  
The drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the end of 
World War II is an antecedent to the human rights movement that is part of 
the story we earlier summarized, but it too can be placed into a similar 
pattern.  As with respect to all these examples, any starting point can be 
moved back to find earlier antecedents and crises.  In any event, the role 
that the Universal Declaration came to play went far beyond what was 
initially envisioned.195
Finally, the legalization of transnational trade brought about through the 
WTO can be linked especially to the Japan-U.S. trade crisis in the 1970s 
and, again, to the relatively few legal idealists—among them U.S. 
academics Robert Hudec and John Jackson—who helped to take major 
foreign policy trade issues and build a scholarly infrastructure that later 
served as the basis to legalize international trade with the transition from 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the WTO.
 
196
There were some links between the human rights side and the economic 
regulation side in the account provided above, but they were relatively weak 
at the initial stages.  Each came into its own in the 1980s after a period of 
  In 
each of these cases, as with respect to international commercial arbitration 
and human rights, we see the emergence of new institutions in part because 
the dramatic social and political changes precipitated by crises do not 
translate into changes that courts and traditional legal doctrine can readily 
absorb. 
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crisis-generated investment in the 1970s.  The paths that they followed were 
relatively similar, even though the people were for the most part quite 
different. 
The relative success in institutionalization with respect to both human 
rights and arbitration, coupled with the passage of time, brought a degree of 
routinization.  Institutions through this process become naturalized and 
decontextualized such that the particular crises and political and economic 
configurations that produced them become obscured.  Instead of appearing 
as the product of particular strategies and configurations of interests, such 
as those at play in the Cold War or the oil crises, the semi-autonomous field 
and its institutions come to appear much more neutral and universal.  Legal 
doctrines are taught as such in law schools, sustained and further formalized 
through legal scholarship, used to resolve disputes, and in general 
legitimated and taken for granted—treated as simply the law.  As a result, 
the legal fields generally develop some distance from the specific interests 
evident at the inception and embedded in the structures of the fields. 
The field of international commercial arbitration in the 1960s and 1970s 
worked out a set of rules to enforce oil concessions against sovereign 
states.197  As noted above, the rules had little impact at the time they were 
developed.  But when arbitration took off in the 1980s, the so-called lex 
mercatoria developed by Continental arbitrators provided a legally 
principled manner to treat multinational agreements with sovereign states in 
the Middle East and Africa as if they were private contracts.198  The 
circumstances of the genesis were by then mostly obscured.  Similarly, the 
link of human rights law to the U.S. legal elite and palace wars within the 
United States was especially apparent in the 1970s and early 1980s, when 
human rights arguments were specifically used to challenge first the Nixon 
and then the Reagan Administrations in favor of a more benevolent form of 
U.S. hegemony.199  At the end of the 1980s, however, international human 
rights concerns were generally accepted as central to foreign relations.200
The framing of social and political interests and issues into the language 
of law, mediated by academic intellectuals who translate non-legal 
economic, political, and social problems into the law, and the movement in 
one form or another of disputes into court-like forums, has an accumulated 
impact.  Political conflicts between oil-producing countries and 
multinational corporations accordingly shift into the subtleties of the lex 
mercatoria.  Arguments over the relationship between human rights and 
national sovereignty replace political battles associated with the Cold War, 
between competing empires, or claims for colonial independence.  The 
credibility and further evolution of the fields gave each of them some 
distance from the political and economic fights that were embedded in 
them. 
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3.  Diverging Paths 
These two types of fields, however, once established and given a certain 
level of credibility, then began to diverge.  The international circulation of 
ideas and approaches involves the movement of texts without the contexts 
that give them their meaning.201
Within the arbitration world, most of the brokers came from a more 
informal network of arbitrators concentrated in Europe but covering much 
of the globe—constituting what is often called the arbitration mafia.
  When a particular legal technology moves 
from one setting to another, how it becomes translated (or mistranslated) 
depends on the structures of power and the positions of the translators who 
deploy the technology.  Similar mistranslations, we hypothesize, also occur 
when there is movement from the national to a transnational level and even 
from one symbolic field—for example, human rights or arbitration—to 
another.  Therefore, after the similar positions developed out of initial 
shocks and periods of legal accumulation, each transnational field 
necessarily developed in its own way.  The different contexts and brokers at 
play continued to shape each area. 
202  
They served alternatively as lawyers and arbitrators in high stakes 
transnational disputes.  The relatively informal and small community at the 
core could take advantage of many others who profited from investment in 
the field.203  Corporate law firms, for example, developed arbitration 
expertise that enhanced their stake in the field.204  The knowledge and 
essentials of arbitration practice could be taken off the shelf and applied to a 
wide range of business disputes.  The practice gained legitimacy and 
developed some autonomy such that it could be transported to new places 
and new types of disputes.  It became simply “offshore justice,” even if the 
courts were private and not public.205  Indeed, one of the leading arbitrators 
in the generation that followed the pioneers even explained the evolution as 
a matter of Weber’s “routinization of charisma.”206  Repeat players came to 
dominate the terrain.207  The routinizers became the “stars” of the next 
generation of arbitrators.208
The field of arbitration evolved through the gradual extension of the field 
into new markets in terms of types of disputes and geographical reach.  
International commercial arbitration facilitated the relatively easy 
conversion of various forms of capital into arbitration, making for a 
  These characteristics allowed the field to grow 
and prosper in new terrains along with economic and corporate law more 
generally. 
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relatively smooth expansion from North-South disputes to transnational 
contracts generally, and to new markets, such as Latin America, which had 
once been hostile to international arbitration.209  Each expansion brought 
new capital and subtle adjustments in the doctrine and approaches, while at 
the same time reinforcing the value of the core of the field.  In particular, 
high barriers to entry to become an arbitrator allowed the gradual 
cooptation of national legal notables who could provide the credibility 
necessary to gain the support of the national court systems.210  The local 
notables in turn invested in the legal capital connected to international 
commercial arbitration as a condition of entry,211
This relatively strong entrenchment of international commercial 
arbitration comes not through any single transnational institutional structure 
but rather through a multiplicity of forums following the same business 
model.  It is a strength that comes from weak links, with a highly flexible 
set of institutions that structure an internationalized market of legal 
expertise.  That market allows national legal notables to accumulate or 
diversify their own portfolios by exchanging their respective forms of 
national capital.  The local impact is therefore relatively limited.  There is a 
spillover into national settings, but it is segmented in a way similar to the 
former colonial courts of Shanghai or Cairo.
 again reinforcing the core 
while extending the field to new terrains. 
212
The area of trade provides a similar example.  As Gregory Shaffer, 
Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, and Barbara Rosenberg show, Brazil found 
ways to push the WTO to accommodate its trade agenda against the 
Western developed world, thereby opening up the field somewhat.
  It is a Western justice—off-
shore “litigociation” handled by corporate law firms—with only a few local 
characteristics. 
213  As a 
result, the politics of the South put the fairness of the trade regime on the 
agenda.214
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  But Brazil’s actions also involved a commitment to work within 
the prevailing WTO regime, which brought increased legitimacy to the core 
of the field.  The gradual move outside the core, as in the case of 
international commercial arbitration, enhanced the legitimacy of the core.  
The process of bringing Brazil in, for example, meant that when the stakes 
were highest, the Brazilian players would take their claims to the law firms 
and expertise tied to the center in Washington, D.C.  Again, the Brazil 
experience suggests the same pattern of national notables participating 
locally in a relatively discrete part of well-entrenched Western justice. 
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In other areas of economic law, we see evidence of a similar 
phenomenon.  Economic law may occasionally be politicized and 
transformed, such as when the steady expansion of U.S.-style intellectual 
property law was challenged and rerouted in response to the AIDS 
epidemic, the high prices that drug companies sought to charge, and 
political changes in the United States that made the government more 
sympathetic to those seeking AIDS medications.  The general story, 
however, is of a gradual expansion under the radar involving corporate law 
firms and national players joining in the spread of a set of transnational 
practices and a business model that goes with it.215
The field of human rights, by contrast, could not really follow a 
specifically legal evolution.  The initial mix was an unstable alliance of 
political activists, media entrepreneurs, and academic idealists.  The 
political issues connected to human rights were often front page news, and 
the institutions created to handle them, such as Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals, were not easily 
separated from the contexts that produced them.
 
216  Those who constructed 
these institutions tended to be lawyer-diplomats who continued to use them 
as part of diplomacy.  For instance, questions of who would be prosecuted 
for what crimes were closely connected to substantial issues of realpolitik.  
Julian Seroussi, for example, documents the contested politics within the 
human rights community about who ought to be prosecuted after the 
Pinochet case opened up the potential for so-called universal jurisdiction.217
In contrast to international commercial arbitration, political actors could 
force quick changes in the terms of engagement in the field of human 
rights.  A relatively early example was the apparent decision of the Pinochet 
government and the generals in Argentina to use the brutal tactic of 
disappearances—instead of explicitly taking political prisoners—to avoid 
the spotlight that Amnesty International brought to prisoners of 
conscience.
  
The public visibility translated into relatively few cases, and the institutions 
created remained fragile and lacking in legitimacy. 
218  A more recent example of such a phenomenon, mass 
executions to avoid witnesses that might sustain a court prosecution, took 
place in the Sri Lankan purge of the Tamil rebels.219
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doctrines of human rights reoccur often in the field, in practice they are 
reinvented and reconfigured in relatively short time intervals for battle in 
new political contexts. 
We see some of this dynamic in the three generations of human rights 
NGOs that we have described elsewhere.220  The ICJ, as mentioned above, 
was very much a product of the Cold War.221  Amnesty International, the 
major embodiment of the second generation, sought to find neutrality by 
limiting its activities initially to prisoners of conscience found in the various 
camps of the Cold War.222  The third generation, epitomized by Human 
Rights Watch, returned the focus to domestic politics and reflected a close 
relationship between U.S. foreign policy and NGO activities.223  Initially 
focused instrumentally on the Reagan Administration, the goal was to 
influence the United States to implement policies that drew on the expertise 
and approach of Human Rights Watch (and the scholars and political and 
social entrepreneurs associated with it).224  In many respects, the 
culmination of this strategy was the Balkan War, pursued by the Clinton 
Administration on the grounds that human rights violations had occurred.225  
The agenda of NGOs has shifted dramatically according to domestic 
political concerns such as the War on Terror.226  There is a new generation, 
in fact, exemplified by International Alert, that focuses on conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping.227
Not only are there strong divergences between the economic side and the 
political side, but there is also very little spillover between the two 
subfields.  As we have seen, they have different structures and diverging 
dynamics.  To be sure, national elites have increasingly invested their 
resources—whether professional, political, or learned—into international 
legal practice and transnational quasi-judicial institutions on the human 
rights side.  The proliferation of human rights courts, however, even 
involving prominent symbolic investments with high visibility in symbolic 
discourses, has not led to any significant impact on national legal practices.  
The transnational political and human rights subfield, in fact, facilitates a 
  It is therefore not a matter of extending the 
field gradually to new arenas and places.  The field jumps around in relation 
to highly visible politics.  There is a strong contrast, in short, between the 
high symbolic value of human rights principles and doctrines and the 
limited autonomy of the legal practices associated with this sphere, which 
are politicized, segmented, and discontinuous. 
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kind of reverse spillover from the South to the North.  The imported 
expertise of human rights and peacekeeping is structured around 
transnational NGOs funded from the North and embedded in hegemonic 
politics.  The Save Darfur coalition is one of many such examples of an 
entity that arises very much out of politics in the North and in particular the 
United States.228
Indeed, the general failure of transitional justice as a catalyst for turning 
ad hoc justice into reform of the courts reinforces the idea that the courts are 
not adequate for transnationally oriented challenges such as human rights 
violations.  This sense of the courts’ failure builds the credibility of forums 
such as international commercial arbitration for transnational corporate 
disputes.  Instead of spillover from the corporate to the human rights side, 
therefore, the problems in the human rights or political subfield contribute 
to the autonomization of corporate transnational justice. 
  The local roots in Africa are very meager.  Such entities 
serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the rule of law promoters within the 
United States.  Northern NGOs facilitate a kind of moral brain drain 
exemplified by the earlier reconversion of Latin American human rights 
pioneers into human rights professionals based in the North. 
B.  The Example of Europe 
Before examining the transnational legal field more generally, it is 
helpful to examine the relatively successful development of a transnational 
legal field in Europe.  The institutional “success” is that the ECJ and the 
ECHR have both been successfully institutionalized and today serve a 
complementary role in Europe.  The ECJ is seen as the Supreme Court of 
Europe and the cornerstone of Europe constructed as a state of law.229  The 
huge caseload of the ECHR has become routinized, and the Court focuses 
on reforming judicial procedures to enhance the rule of law.230  The two 
courts have also converged in recruitment with a heavy focus on academic 
capital.231
After World War II, the project of rebuilding Europe was part and parcel 
of the attempt to contain the spread of communism.
  Yet we must also recognize that Europe shares many of the 
structural features detailed in the above examination of the transnational 
legal field.  Europe provides one channel for the internationalization of 
national legal fields, and some of the issues we see in Europe also arise with 
respect to the transnational legal field. 
232
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of new European institutions—the beginnings of what became the European 
Community (EC).233  Again, crisis was an opportunity, as the beginning of 
the Cold War set the initial stage for construction of a transnational legal 
field.  Law, as in the above examples, was initially at the margins of the 
main events.  Nevertheless, cosmopolitan lawyer intermediaries who were 
well connected to prominent counterparts in the United States, such as 
George Ball, were central to the process of seeking to organize Europe.234  
As Antonin Cohen points out, the activities of “a small set of multi-
positioned politico-legal entrepreneurs” planted seeds for later 
developments by making sure that each of the two major European 
organizations, the predecessors to the European Community on one side, 
and the Council of Europe on the other, were provided with courts.235  The 
two courts, the ECJ and the ECHR, contributed very little at the outset to 
the European project.236
The key actors in building a European legal field were, as shown by 
Antoine Vauchez, an early transnational legal network located at the 
crossroads between the national and the European levels.
  This very limited role, moreover, was consistent 
with the expectations of those who created the courts. 
237  This group 
took advantage of early EC investment aimed toward facilitating the 
development of European scholarly knowledge beyond national legal 
literature.238  One indicator of the success of this investment is that the 
various Jean Monnet projects focused on European law now bring together 
1,500 professors and approximately 500,000 students every year.  There are 
also specifically European legal specialties and even a couple of academic 
institutions, namely the College of Europe in Bruges and the European 
University Institute in Florence.239  In addition, the actors built their 
network of European professionals through a diplomatic logic that took 
advantage of the fact that judges were appointed by nation states with parity 
among the key countries.  Cases were argued in the language of the 
defending party,240
One particular EU-subsidized academic and professional group, the 
Fédération internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE),  
 which limited competition and promoted within each 
country a small European bar with appropriate expertise and linguistic 
abilities, and with an interest in the academic promotion of European law.  
The group thus blurred the differences in legal status at the national levels. 
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spearheaded the efforts to define a rationality that would make 
sense of the set of EC institutions built in the Paris and Rome 
treaties, one that would be distinguishable from that of national 
political systems and yet, at the same time, autonomous from the 
other European arenas (economic, bureaucratic, etc).241
They drew on their domestic legal expertise and capital and on models 
from abroad, especially from the United States, to build and legitimate 
something European.
   
242  They were able to take advantage of a perceived 
crisis of the EC late in the 1950s to transform the position of the ECJ.243
The famous cases of the early 1960s were designed to take advantage of 
this growing network of Europrofessionals.  There was a very close 
relationship between the European scholarship emanating from FIDE, the 
judges and advocate generals of the ECJ, and the lawyers who staged, 
decided, interpreted, and celebrated the two key ECJ cases:  Van Gend en 
Loos,
 
244 decided in 1962, and Costa v. ENEL,245 decided in 1964.246  The 
ECJ’s pathbreaking legal rhetoric was carefully mixed with unobtrusive 
judicial results in the particular cases.247
The story of the ECHR proceeds differently, but again reveals the 
dramatic shift from origins to institutionalization.  Madsen documents the 
very weak initial role of the ECHR in addressing human rights violations 
within Europe and the orientation of the Council of Europe as an instrument 
of the Cold War carefully constructed to avoid issues connected to 
European colonies.
  The cases then became the 
material for the elaboration of an ambitious constitution for Europe, and a 
new role and agenda for the ECJ as a kind of constitutional court. 
248
The main objective of the European Convention of 1950 was, 
therefore, not the development of a detailed European 
jurisprudence that should substantially alter national traditions of 
human rights, but instead producing a document that confined the 
area of Free Europe; that is, the [European] Convention was an 
early form of containment politics.
  In Madsen’s terms,  
249
Early cases, however, challenged the policing approaches used to 
maintain colonial relationships, building the role of the court even if the 
court carefully refrained at the outset from any direct challenge to colonial 
activities.
   
250
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rights movement.251
The two courts—and indeed the organizations to which they belonged—
were initially quite different.  The judges of the two courts, for example, 
originally came from very different backgrounds.
  It became a kind of Supreme Court reviewing the 
human rights policies of individual European countries.  The court became 
solidly institutionalized.  Again, the agenda dramatically changed from the 
period of the establishment of the court, leading the ECHR in the individual 
rights sphere to a position parallel to the ECJ in the economic sphere. 
252
This relatively successful transnational development, however, has not 
had a major impact at the national level.  Few judges and European 
practitioners return to national judiciaries.
  But the strong 
differences in career paths of those appointed to each court have diminished 
recently, which is an indicator of competition and reciprocal influence.  
Indeed, the courts now overlap much more in the issues they examine, 
complementing each other while building a more unified European legal 
field—fueled also by the continued flourishing of European academic 
programs and scholarship inside and outside of Europe (which has, of 
course, also expanded to the East).  In this manner, both sides of the 
European legal field show signs of coming together more explicitly.  
Advocates comfortable within the European legal field can begin to engage 
in forum shopping in order to advance their interests, further developing the 
field as a whole. 
253  The clerks of the ECJ and the 
lawyers of the European Commission are mainly recruited by national law 
firms of the multinational firms centered in London.254  More generally, 
training and experience in European legal practice tends to provide a 
stepping stone from national legal fields toward more international—
including transatlantic—positions.255  The analysis suggests, therefore, that 
the supranational field is still relatively weak in the sense that it serves 
mainly as a crossroad between national legal fields where legal expertise is 
accumulated and valorized.  The actual law schools, for example, are 
national despite the existence of European legal departments in Bruges and 
Florence.256  Still, there has been a slow process of the valorization of 
European (and international) legal expertise as a legitimate resource in 
national careers, even if still not sufficient to provide access to top positions 
in the judiciary or among the elite of the bar.257  And within Europe, there 
remains a pronounced division between the elite of the corporate bar and 
human rights circles.258
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C.  The Changing Market for Legal Education 
The market for legal education provides a potential forum to bring 
together different sides at national and transnational levels.  Potentially, the 
children of top business executives can connect with the children of the 
clergy; old money can connect with new money and emerging social 
groups; moral entrepreneurs can link with profit maximizers; and local 
know-who can connect with imported know-how.  The law faculty in many 
countries of the world is a melting pot to produce what Bourdieu termed the 
degree of the bourgeoisie.259  It is the place where, historically, the old elite 
represented by the aristocracy and feudalism could be converted into the 
advisers and conflict managers for emerging states and multinational 
enterprises.  Those who brought social capital, as noted by Ralf Dahrendorf 
about Germany,260
There is no question that there is an emerging global competition in legal 
education.
 might specialize in social skills such as drinking and 
dueling, while those lacking social endowments could over-invest in 
learning and the production of law, making for a division of labor bringing 
legitimacy and stature to the profession. 
261  New or substantially reformed law schools in many parts of 
the world—including India with first the National Law Schools and now the 
Jindal Global Law School; South Korea and Japan with the shift from 
undergraduate legal instruction toward U.S.-style law schools; and the FGV 
Law School in Brazil’s globalized program—are seeking to gain stature as 
global law schools.262  The implications of these developments merit 
further study, but at present the competition is still dominated by the elite 
U.S. law schools, which provide the only common breeding ground for 
corporate lawyers, European politico-legal entrepreneurs, and a small 
number of NGO activists who export agendas shaped by U.S. hegemonic 
politics, such as Darfur and the field of transitional justice (aided by 
European funding).263
CONCLUSION:  SPILLOVER AND LEGITIMACY 
 
The basic question of this Article is the possibility of spillover in the 
creation of legitimacy—the conversion of social capital into legal capital 
and the corresponding transfer of legitimacy from one sector of legal 
practice to another.  At the national level, focusing on Asian examples, we 
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observed that the conversion process of social into legal capital has so far 
been relatively limited in China, which means a relatively limited spillover 
from the small corporate bar into an enhanced role of lawyers in the field of 
political power.264  Similarly, experiments in legal aid or clinical education 
have not in the short term served as Trojan horses to get lawyers a stronger 
position in state governance.  There are examples of such crossovers in 
Asia, however.  In particular, lawyer-brokers took advantage of the 
changing political situation in South Korea, and they built on the small and 
elite profession, which was a legacy of Japanese colonialism.265  Similarly, 
Indonesia provides a particularly good example of the kind of process that 
is evident in South Korea266
Such relative successes provide the bases for strengthening the role of 
law more generally in the economy and the state.  The process is never 
simple, however.  Law is a symbolic good.  As such, it must be legitimated 
before it can successfully be exploited.  Legitimation comes when there is a 
collective belief that legal authority will provide something of value to the 
holders of economic and political power.  It may take a generation or more 
of work by lawyers and institutions before the (re)production of legal 
knowledge is in a position to offer legitimacy to the holders of economic 
and political power, and for there to be sufficient distance to make that offer 
credible.  Within the United States, over a long period of time and as a 
result of a very specific history, corporate lawyers in conjunction with law 
schools and philanthropic organizations succeeded in becoming the 
essential experts according to rules that they shaped, which allowed their 
clients to thrive under an umbrella of legal legitimacy.  It is no surprise that 
the era of U.S. hegemony brings efforts to reproduce at the transnational 
level something akin to that which made elite lawyers thrive in the United 
States. 
:  A corporate bar moves out of a relatively 
isolated and foreign-oriented enclave into a broader role in the state and in 
the national economy. 
The complex development of legal Europe provides an example of the 
interplay of courts, legal education, corporate law firms, and U.S.-generated 
expertise.  The result of legal entrepreneurship taking advantage of its 
national capital and external situations—the Cold War and the related rise 
of the international human rights movement, for example—succeeded in 
giving a role to law, lawyers, and courts far beyond what the founders of 
the various European institutions envisioned.  But the relative success in 
bridging two sides in Europe has also been consistent with the relative 
weakness of the European legal field in comparison to the national legal 
fields. 
There is no inevitability to the overcoming of the divide between the 
political and the economic sides of transnational justice, and the credibility 
of one or both sides could erode quickly—as has happened many times in 
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domestic settings.  Too close or transparent connections between elite 
lawyers and large financial interests or repressive politics, for example, can 
derail the potential trajectory toward transnational justice that we have 
described.  Furthermore, as we noted at the outset, the kind of legitimate 
hegemony that was the ideal of Warren Christopher and represented the 
legacy of the foreign policy establishment in the United States is contested 
in U.S. palace wars and potentially through rival hegemonies seeking to 
shape the global rules of the game.  Lawyers are seeking to construct a field 
of transnational justice and to take advantage of this field.  They have 
achieved some successes.  Reforms in legal education may provide greater 
opportunities to build on those successes and further bridge the divide 
between the political side of transnational justice and the economic side.  
But at present, there is a strong divide between the political and economic 
sides of a transnational legal field, potentially threatening the legitimacy of 
both sides. 
 
